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THE NEW INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION*
PHILIP A.

HARTj

The first Industrial Revolution which burst upon the Western
World in the late Eighteenth Century created a social and economic
upheaval of unprecedented proportions. The factory system replaced
the skilled handicraftsman; the beginnings of mass production introduced scale economies which have transformed the industrialized
countries of the world. It also "spawned" certain basic concepts on
industrial organization popularized in part by Marx, Shumpter, and
most recently by J. K. Galbraith.
These involved the notion that efficiency and technology require
giant industrial units and necessarily a high degree of industrial concentration. If this is true, of course, it means that an intricate degree
of government control must replace the marketplace as a regulator
of prices and product allocation. For no free society can tolerate private industrial empires, responsible only to themselves, making economic decisions affecting the economic, political and social structure
of this society without the restraint of either government or competition. Certainly, it should be dear by now that in the highly concentrated society "competition" is only a word, not a reality.
It is surprising to me that so many have accepted a view-that in
this nation giant corporations are inevitable-which is so profound in
its consequences, without critical evaluation. For our acceptance or
rejection of these concepts will largely determine the course of the
new industrial revolution which I believe is now enveloping this
country.
This new revolution is the result of two forces-the dramatic technological breakthrough now taking place and the merger explosion of the past two decades which is still gaining momentum. Already
our two hundred largest corporations control almost sixty percent of
all manufacturing assets in the United States. If I were an old Populist,
I would say that there were two hundred men who control sixty percent of all the finished products. This merger movement which has
been characterized by the conglomerate merger in which the corpora*A speech delivered at Washington and Lee University on November 15, 1967,
under the auspices of the School of Law and the School of Commerce and Administration.
tUnited States Senator; Chairman of the Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee; A.B. Georgetown 1934, J.D. Michigan
1937.
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tion diversifies into relatively unrelated product lines is dramatic. Airframe manufacturers are producing toothpaste and toothpick manufacturers are producing rocketships.
The writings of Galbraith and like-minded thinkers would indeed
have been pertinent in the first industrial revolution. In that period
bigger plants generally did mean more efficient production and lower
prices to consumers. The impetus to new technology generally did
come from the larger industrialists of the day. But to carry over the
lessons of the Eighteenth Century-no matter how subconsciouslyinto the realities of today's industrial complex simply makes no sense.
We know now that plants do have optimum sizes after which no
further scale economies appear. More important the largest of modern
corporations is not one or even several plants producing the same
product. It is more likely to be a giant holding company reaching into
many phases of production and service. Actually there are few efficiencies in the giant conglomerate because of its great size and the unrelated functions it seeks to direct. Efficiencies from economics of
scale are basically plant efficiencies, and in most concentrated industries we find a great deviation between company concentration and
plant concentration. Further distribution efficiencies, which some have
attributed to the conglomerate, are more than often offset-if they
exist at all-by other economic and managerial disadvantages involved
in the complexities of multi-plant and multi-product operations.
The hearings of the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee have
indicated that in many cases the most efficient companies are in the
middle size range, no matter what measure is used-such as profitability, not an alien measure to our society.
Unfortunately, what Galbraith and others have tended to do is
to equate economic power-with its ability to coerce-with economic
efficiency. For example, the large consumer product firms are able
to get essential advertising at substantial discounts as compared to
a smaller, less diversified firm. These discounts result from economic
power-not cost savings-nor are they reflected in lower prices for
the consumer. It strains the analogy somewhat but to illustrate the
point, if when law students went to write their bar exams, they were
handed not a pen and paper but boxing gloves and told to slug it
out and that the sixty percent left standing would be lawyers, they
might be appalled. The strongest would be lawyers-and in a sense
that is an efficiency, but not a relevant one. Power, not proficiency,
would determine the ranks of the legal profession. I am suggesting
that this is the type of thing that some inaccurately regard as efficiency.
It appears to me that this is what is happening in our industrial
complex today. Power, not efficiency, is the driving force and the
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end result of giant conglomeration. Power, of course, takes many
forms, and I use it here in its widest sense. In the area of mergers, it
is reflected in the emphasis put on financial manipulation rather than
more efficient operation. Why do companies merge today? A reading
of current literature and periodicals on reasons for mergers makes
more sense to an accountant or investment banker than either an
engineer or lawyer. Companies buy "earnings" or "cash flow" or
"tax carryover"; they issue convertible debentures so as not to water
their capital base. They are concerned about maintaining the return
on capital investment, the "earnings per share" ratio-the financial
considerations that drive up stock values. I say this not in criticism,
but only to point out that efficiency or profit maximization is not
the primary motivating force behind the current merger movement.
But assume for a moment that the giant corporation operating in
highly concentrated markets could turn out a better product at lower
costs-a premise which I am not prepared to accept, but let us assume
it. The resulting efficiency would serve no public interest unless
competition required it to be passed on to the consumers in the form
of lower prices. Yet great concentration and oligopoly markets today dominate our industrial landscape. The result is that the market
does not set the price; the company does. The company has always
set prices, I know, but it has set them in response to some market
discipline which today is little evident. It sets a target profit, prices
accordingly, and other oligopolists engage in what I call lockstep pricing. Most companies in highly concentrated industries price together.
For example, if Bethlehem Steel announces a five dollar a ton increase in steel, the only remaining question then is when the others
will go up to meet it. The Wall Street Journal, for instance, is now
in the habit of talking about "industry price hikes," not company
"price hikes." Doesn't this suggest that, at least, there has been
some dilution of competition, that cost savings or increases in productivity mean higher profits, not lower prices?
Today's concern with inflation illustrates this point. Industry
is operating at about eighty-three per cent capacity-its lowest point
in a year. If competition in the traditional sense were at work, one
would expect prices to fall, not rise. Yet prices continue to rise because for the company to reach a target profit in the face of falling
capacity or decreased demand, it must raise its prices. What we are
faced with today, in my opinion, is not inflation in its traditional sense,
but price hikes brought about by the failure of the marketplace, or
competition, to operate freely. One hundred years ago the case was
clear that they were, but today I doubt it.
What about technology? Are the giant corporations necessary for
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technological advances? In this area the subcommittee has held extensive hearings. The results are, as I read them, conclusive: both
invention and innovation are just as likely-if not more likely-to
come from the individual inventor, and the small and medium size
corporation than the large corporate complex. A research organization which did a study for the subcommittee put it this way:
We have seen the continuing significant role of technically
trained, sophisticated independent inventors, who have broken
off either from universities, government laboratories, or industrial firms, in the invention of new technologies. We have
seen independent technological entrepreneurs play a significant
role in the establishment of new small technology-based firms
devoted to the first introduction of new technology into use.'
The hearings include example after example of significant technological breakthroughs in which the larger corporation, not only
did not play a role, but in fact failed to perceive the advantages or,
in fact, discouraged development of the breakthrough technology.
Indeed, this last point is crucial. The giant corporation with great
amounts of capital sunk in present technology often has strong economic incentive to discourage, not encourage, new technologies. For
instance, a practical electric car has been developed both in England
and this country by very small entrepreneurs and should be manufactured next year-despite the advantage one would expect the giant
automobile manufacturers to have in this field.
The paradox of our present industrial organization is that while
overall concentration is rising and bigness is justified by technological
imperatives, the natural thrust of new technologies should be toward
a more deconcentrated economy increasingly influenced by smaller
firms. Modern computer developments, for instance, now available
by pooling or leasing arrangements to the smallest corporation, allow
economies that once could be obtained only by the largest firms.
The new technologies, in many industries, have dramatically cut
capital investment and operating costs. For instance, automobile
bodies made from new plastic molding processes can result in bodies
at least as strong as steel with only a fraction of the capital costs
once necessary for the giant presses needed to stamp out steel bodies.
Of course, if the company has eighty-two acres of plant with presses
only appropriate for stamping out steel, it will be reluctant to change
to plastic unless the transition period will be so quick that the loss
of capital equipment can be absorbed.
'Hearings Before the Senate Anti-trust and Monopoly Subcomm., goth Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 6, at 2750 (1967).
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The development of pre-stressed concrete has challenged structural
steel in many areas. The result-again because of low capital requirements involved in the technology-has been the rapid growth of a
competitive pre-stressed concrete industry dominated by smaller
producers. It has resulted in great savings, for instance, in highway
building programs.
The development of reinforced plastics has developed a highly
competitive industry of plastic molders turning out such diverse
products as containers, automobile parts, construction material and
marine transportation. Again, small capital requirements and the
need for great technical skill have resulted in an industry characterized
by smaller, efficient and competitive companies. The thrust, then,
of the new technologies should be toward a decentralized, more
competitive marketplace.
If what I have said is true, the contrast between the old and
new industrial revolution should be clear. Bigness in the old was
necessary for economic efficiency and for technological advance. Bigness in the new is necessary for neither. If freed from restraints of
monopoly power flowing from a highly concentrated industry structure, the new industrial revolution should result in greater efficiency
in the smaller, not the giant, firm.
However, to hasten this development, strong antitrust enforcement
is needed. Once the "inevitability of bigness" thesis is recognized
as fallacious, antitrust becomes manageable. The tools are available
to attack many of the giant conglomerate mergers. Antitrust tools,
although rusty, also are available to reach identical pricing. If we
can slow down the growth of overall concentration through the
conglomerate merger, if we can move against some of the artificial
restraints such as advertising discriminations, then a meaningful
competitive economy is possible, indeed, inevitable.
The necessity for such a program is based not only on economic
considerations, but also political ones. Here is where a person who
is not an economist may feel more comfortable. Most people would
agree that there is a substantial correlation between economic power
and political power. We feel more comfortable in a democratic society
when political power is dispersed. But to do that we must also disperse economic power. And this is what the antitrust laws are all
about.
This is a time in our history when our basic institutions are under
close scrutiny; particularly on the college campuses of this country.
Attention should also be paid to an essential ingredient in any discussion of power in a democratic country-that is antitrust and its
relationship to our political structure. I believe that when its role
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is clearly understood the political constituency will develop which will
strengthen, encourage, support and demand meaningful, forceful
antitrust enforcement. There is no such constituency today, and I
think that it is very regrettable. Perhaps as responsible as any for the
dismissal and distrust of antitrust have been those who have made
old-school Populist speeches about power and big business. We tend
to react automatically to reject that type of approach, and oftentimes
it is used for very short term gains and with motives anything but
healthy. We can go through the ritual of saying that bigness and
smallness per se are neither bad nor good, but we must discipline
ourselves to acknowledge that bigness has characteristics that smallness does not and that these distinctions and differences require different treatments.
We would all agree that if in this country tomorrow there would
be but one source from which all products would flow and to which
all people would have to go for employment that it would not be
the type of society we would want. However, it would never reach
that point because before it did outraged public opinion would
require direct wage and price controls. We all agree that one source
only would be intolerable; in my opinion, the two hundred corporations that constitute sixty percent of our source is equally intolerable.
Between one and two hundred where is the breaking point? Where
should the whistle really blow? As the concentration increases, inescapably we come to a government reaction which those who are
frequently the most critical of antitrust would be the first to protest.
A people organized as we are could not tolerate such an ultimate
concentration of economic power; we would require the only other
equivalent power structure to move in and run it. Then we would
be knee deep in the kind of government directed economics that most
antitrust critics would be the first to condemn.
My deep concern is that we are moving rapidly toward a society
no thoughtful person really wants without an awareness of where
we are going or what the consequences may be. The time is here,
I believe, to dust off our antitrust laws and begin seriously to take
effective action against concentration of economic power with all its
political consequences.

